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Abstract: In the New Zealand school statistics curriculum, year 12 students (aged 16-17) are required to solve 
problems that involve interpreting risk and relative risk within a range of meaningful contexts. In a small 
exploratory study we investigate the risk conceptions of four year 13 students who performed at the 
excellence level in their year 12 externally-assessed examination on this topic. Through questionnaires and 
interviews we investigate the ways in which these students perceive and express risks associated with a 
variety of everyday activities and also how they compare the risks of several adverse outcomes.  We also 
explore the strategies they use when confronted with varied representations of risk such as visual, verbal and 
numerical. We will report on insights gained about these students’ reasoning with different risk 
representations, on how they interpret, evaluate and communicate risk. 
Keywords: secondary school students; heuristics; risk perceptions; risk representations; risk interpretations; 
relative risk. 
 
Introduction 
Statistical information is prolific in the media, yet many of us are misled, or have difficulty in 
interpreting and challenging statements made. In order to be an educated citizen in the twenty-first 
century, “(S)tatistical literacy is becoming fundamental for living in a full democracy” (Biggeri & 
Zuliani, 1999, p. 2). An important facet of statistical literacy is the ability to reason and to make 
judgments when an element of uncertainty is involved. We tend to rely on our gut feelings, combined 
with personal experiences or beliefs in order to make such decisions, and often use shortcuts such as 
the availability and representative heuristics (Kahneman, 2011). However, this approach may fail us 
when circumstances require more of an analytic assessment. Examples of such situations include the 
choice of a particular medical plan, the decision to invest in stocks or shares, assessing tsunami risk 
and measuring the effects of changes to scheduling of transport systems. Although sometimes trivial, 
the consequences of such decisions can be significant. Thus an understanding of risk is important in 
order to be an educated citizen in the 21st century.  
The topic of risk was introduced to the New Zealand school statistics curriculum in 2012. The 
result of this is that year 12 students (aged 16-17) are now required to solve problems that involve 
calculating and interpreting risk and relative risk within a range of meaningful contexts. In addition 
to concepts such as risk and relative risk, the topic involves probability distributions, relative 
frequencies, two-way tables and probability trees. Students need to be able to demonstrate 
knowledge of probability concepts and terms, and to communicate using appropriate representations. 
This small exploratory study, involving four students, is a first attempt to explore how these students 
now perceive and express risks associated with every day activities, how they compare risks of 
several adverse outcomes and what strategies they use when confronted with varied representations 
of risk such as verbal, visual and numerical. 
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Background Literature 
What is Risk?  
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of the word ‘risk’ is “(Exposure to) the possibility 
of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a 
possibility”. The everyday definition of risk will depend on the context in which it is being used. One 
common way of defining risk is as an uncertainty based on historical observations (Gigerenzer, 
2002; Johnson, 2004) with other definitions including a hazard, or a potential adversity or threat that 
requires exposure and uncertainty (Slovic & Weber, 2002). As a concept, risk can refer to a 
probability or to a consequence or to the product of probability and consequence. For example, to 
answer the question “what is the risk of getting cancer if I eat processed meat frequently?” one might 
respond with a numerical value such as 0.01 or 1%. On the other hand, to answer the question “what 
is the risk of defaulting on my mortgage payments?” the response may be that my home will be 
repossessed by the bank. Gardner (2008) noted that risk can be perceived as the product of the 
probability of an event occurring and the value placed on its consequence. A study carried out by 
Sadique, Devlin, Edmunds, and Parkin (2013), explored decisions made by mothers who were given 
a hypothetical situation and asked whether or not they would vaccinate their child against a disease. 
The severity of the health effects associated with the disease was explained as was the severity of the 
adverse side-effects due to the vaccine, together with the probabilities of their occurrence. Their 
findings suggested that the information regarding consequence, in this case the severity of the health 
effects associated with the disease and the severity of the adverse side-effects due to the vaccination, 
influenced the mothers’ decision to vaccinate or not, while “the probability of these events occurring 
was not a significant predictor” (p. 1). The very fact that the term risk encompasses multiple 
definitions and concepts results in many of us having trouble in both interpreting and communicating 
risk (Slovic & Weber, 2002).   
Communication of Risk 
It is a well-established fact that our perception of risk is influenced by the way in which that 
risk is presented (Gigerenzer & Edwards, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Utts, 2005). Since the 
provider of risk information is at liberty to choose how to convey the information, they are free to 
select the method that best serves their interest. An example might be a drug company quoting the 
benefit of their treatment in terms of relative risk instead of absolute risk in order to make results 
more compelling. Thus, owing to the many and varied ways in which risk can be communicated, we 
are easily manipulated. In a risk-literate society, citizens should have the ability to interpret risk in its 
many forms in order to make informed life-decisions (Gal, 2005). It is therefore desirable for 
learners to experience risk information in several formats, and to appreciate that the provider of 
information may present information in a manner that suits their own agenda, and not necessarily 
that of the consumer. 
Verbal communication. Verbal representations allow for flexibility in risk communication 
and, as such, have the potential to capture consumers’ emotions and intuitions in a way that 
numerical and graphical representations cannot. While this may enhance risk comprehension in some 
instances, there is also the potential for confusion and misunderstanding, particularly when the 
communicator of the risk information has an agenda to push. In particular, the manner in which 
information is framed, the verbal frame, can affect the way in which that information is perceived 
and acted upon. For example, when persuading patients to undertake a risky treatment option, 
evidence suggests that presenting probabilistic or risk information in a positive frame is more 
effective than presenting it in a negative frame (Edwards, Elwyn, Covey, Mathews, & Pill, 2001). 
However, when considering how to communicate the risks associated with taking part in a screening 
programme it appears that loss framing, where the potential losses from refusing to participate in the 
programme are described, has a greater impact on participation rates than gain framing, where 
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potential gains from agreeing to participate in the screening programme are described (Gigerenzer & 
Edwards, 2003). 
Visual communication. Visual displays of information, whether static or animated, have the 
potential to capture attention, summarise data effectively and to reveal potentially undetected 
patterns such as part-to-whole relationships (Eppler & Aeschimann, 2009). However, they are not 
immune to manipulation by risk information providers. When considering the design of a visual risk 
representation, it is important to consider the audience and to ensure that important details are 
highlighted, and superfluous details are avoided. Effective visual representations need to be designed 
carefully so that misinterpretation is minimised. Often, simpler graphs are more effective than more 
complicated graphs (Zikmund-Fisher, Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2010).  
Numerical communication. Since a common way of representing and communicating risk is 
in numerical format, consumers of such information require adequate numeracy skills (Fagerlin, 
Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Janlovic, Derry, & Smith, 2007). However, even with sufficient proficiency, 
the way in which risks are expressed mathematically has an influence on their interpretation 
(Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Evidence suggests that expressing risks with 
natural frequencies lends itself to easier interpretation than proportions, probabilities or percentages 
since this is how statistical information has been presented historically, and the human mind is well-
adapted to information in this form (Gigerenzer, Gaissmeier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 
2007; Martignon, 2014; Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007). 
Perception of Risk, Heuristics and Biases 
People tend to perceive and react to risk in one of two ways; either as risk as analysis, or as 
risk as feelings (Slovic & Peters, 2006). While risk as analysis refers to a logical and rational 
treatment of risk information, risk as feelings refers to a reflexive reaction which may be based on no 
more than a hunch or a gut feeling. When judging or interpreting risk as feelings, we are susceptible 
to appealing shortcuts or heuristics which, although reliable in some instances, may also lead us 
astray. The availability heuristic is a shortcut we use that allows us to make a judgment based on 
how easy it is to recall a particular situation (Kahneman, 2011). For example, we tend to think that 
deaths due to causes such as murder, airplane accidents and shark attacks are more common than 
deaths due to less memorable causes such as flu, heart disease and diabetes due in part to the well-
documented tendency for the media to devote more column-inches to relatively rare events than to 
conditions or behaviours that carry higher risks (Aronson, 2006; Harrabin, Coote, & Allen, 2003; 
Thirlaway & Heggs, 2010). This phenomenon results in the availability heuristic leading us astray. 
However, the availability heuristic may also serve us well. For example, if we find ourselves in a 
problematic position, we may recall unpleasant consequences occurring in a similar situation, and act 
to better protect ourselves. Another common shortcut is the control heuristic. Thompson, Armstrong, 
and Thomas (1998) suggest that people often adopt the control heuristic when assessing their 
personal influence over the occurrence of an outcome, even in chance situations. The control 
heuristic is comprised of both the intention to achieve an outcome and the perceived connection 
between one’s action and the outcome. When we perceive a connection between action and outcome, 
the notion of personal control will be high. As with the availability heuristic, the control heuristic can 
lead to accurate judgments in situations such as those where we do in fact have control. However, in 
situations where we have little or no control, the control heuristic can give rise to erroneous 
decisions.  
There are also several biases to which we are susceptible when receiving and interpreting risk 
information. According to Weinstein (1989, p. 1232), the optimism bias has the result that “people 
regard themselves as more likely than others to experience financial success, career advancement, 
and long life”.  This bias results in the belief that one’s own risk is lower than the risk faced by other 
individuals sharing the same behaviour. Other examples of the optimism bias in action include 
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judging our driving skills as higher than average, and our chance of being involved in traffic 
accidents being lower than for others (Svenson, Fischhoff, & MacGregor, 1985). The bias of risk 
denial arises when evidence is considered as reliable and informative only if it is consistent with 
one’s beliefs, otherwise it is dismissed (Everitt, 1999). Another bias, the anchoring bias, relates to 
our inclination to rely heavily on one, often irrelevant, piece of information when making judgments, 
often evaluating new information against this anchor (Anderson & Iltis, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).  
How Risk Should Be Taught 
It seems indisputable that an understanding of risk is crucial in order for us to participate in 
the modern world. Thus, “training young students in the perception of risk has become fundamental 
in modern society”, (Martignon, 2014, p. 157).  According to Gal (2005), risk literacy is a branch of 
probability literacy that is closely related to statistical literacy. He describes five main knowledge 
classes and some dispositions which he proposes form the basic foundation of probability literacy. 
The knowledge elements comprise (1) big ideas (such as variation, randomness, and independence), 
(2) figuring probabilities, (3) language, (4) context, and (5) critical questions. Dispositional elements 
include critical stance, beliefs and attitudes, and personal sentiments such as risk aversion. 
Probability instruction in school has a tendency to be based on probability axioms and mathematical 
calculations (Greer & Mukhopadhyay, 2005; Jones, 2005). However, for the vast majority of us, the 
situations that necessitate us to draw on probability knowledge will be those requiring judgments or 
interpretations, not calculations. Gal (2005) has proposed some critical questions that consumers 
should use when interpreting statistical and probability claims. Based on these, and on what others 
consider that consumers need to ask about probability, and risk in particular (Gigerenzer et al., 2007; 
Utts, 2005), the following critical risk questions are proposed (see Table 1). 
Big idea Details 
The risk of what? • Baseline information 
• Risk communication  
 (verbal, visual, numerical format) 
What is the frame? • Time frame 
• Verbal frame 
To whom does the risk apply? • Does it apply to me? 
Table 1. Proposed critical questions for risk literacy 
Risk in the New Zealand Mathematics and Statistics Curriculum 
In 2012 the New Zealand Mathematics and Statistics Curriculum introduced a National 
Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) standard at Level 2 (penultimate school year for 
most students) which in part relates to interpreting risk and relative risk. This standard, Apply 
probability methods in solving problems, requires students to exhibit proficiency in selecting and 
using methods, demonstrate knowledge of probability concepts and terms and to communicate using 
appropriate representations. The problems that are used are set in either real-life or statistical 
contexts, with probability methods including risk, relative risk, probability distributions, relative 
frequencies, two-way tables and probability trees. A typical risk-based question would describe a 
study with a real-life context such as, for example, wishing to investigate the prevalence of a disease 
in individuals with differing characteristics. It may be of interest to establish whether one group of 
individuals is more susceptible to the disease than another group, or that treatment A is more 
effective in combatting the disease than treatment B. Information may be given in terms of frequency 
data, or in a two-way table. Students are expected to be able to calculate probabilities, conditional 
probabilities, absolute risks and relative risks and possibly to critique media statements based on 
findings from the study in question. Although interpreting risk formed a small part of this standard, it 
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was of interest to determine to what extent students’ experiences from the previous year remained 
with them as they were confronted with new risk situations and representations. 
 
Methods 
This study was exploratory in nature, with the purpose of developing a deeper awareness of 
the issues associated with learning about risk in the school curriculum. The participants in this study 
were four Year 13 (aged 16 and 17) students attending a single-sex girls’ secondary school in New 
Zealand. The participants were selected randomly from a larger group of 20 students from the same 
school, all of whom achieved well. The second author collected the data which comprised 
questionnaire responses and interviews. The students first completed a questionnaire designed to 
elicit their understanding of risk in a variety of ways. Six of the nine questions in the questionnaire 
were from the work of Dargahi-Noubary & Growney (1998),  one question was adapted from Iman 
(1994), one from Fagerlin et al. (2007), and one from a previous Year 12 national examination. The 
questions required the students to describe, calculate, compare and interpret risk in several contexts 
and, where relevant, were asked to explain their answers. Once the students had completed the 
questionnaires, two follow-up interviews were carried out with the students working in pairs. The 
purpose of the first interview was to gain more insight into student responses in the questionnaires, 
while the aim of the second interview was to explore their reasoning strategies when presented with 
varied, and sometimes unfamiliar, risk representations. The interviews were video-recorded and 
transcribed for analysis. A thematic qualitative data analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was conducted 
on the student questionnaire responses and student interviews.  
 
Analysis 
Since similar themes were obtained from several questions and tasks given to the students, 
attention will focus on only five of the nine questions in the questionnaire, and on three of the four 
tasks that formed the second interview. In sections 4.1 to 4.3, we focus on Questions 1, 2, 3 and 6 of 
the questionnaire. In section 4.4 we present findings from the second interview where students were 
given four risk representation tasks. Three of the four tasks will be focused on, and at this stage 
Question 9 from the questionnaire will also be discussed.  
Description/Definition of Risk 
The first question (Dargahi-Noubary & Growney, 1998) required the students to state what 
they knew about the topic of risk based on their general knowledge, school work, or from what they 
had heard in the media. While not specifically asked to do so, three of the four students (Students A, 
B and C) provided their definition of risk. All of these students defined risk as the likelihood of an 
event occurring, or words to that effect. Two of these students stated that the event in question was 
undesirable, that is they associated risk with a negative outcome. Student B’s response was “Risk is 
how likely something is to occur, usually in regards to a negative outcome”, whereas Student C 
responded “Risk is how likely something bad is going to happen”. Student A stated that there were 
“good risks and bad risks” while Student D answered the question by mentioning how she thought 
the media portrayed risk, and by stating that her school experiences taught her to consider “the 
consequences of our actions and risk which comes with the choices we make.” This student is 
thinking on a broader level than the other three by reflecting on how risk is generally portrayed in 
society. 
In Question 3 the students were asked to choose their preferred definition of the term risk 
from a list of four provided in Table 2.  
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Which of these definitions of risk do you prefer? Explain. 
(a) A probability with a negative connotation 
(b) A type of probability that has no theoretical model 
(c) An uncertainty that has a numerical value 
(d) Other – (explain) 
Table 2. Risk definitions provided to students in Question 3 (Dargahi-Noubary & Growney, 
1998, p. 45) 
Given their responses to Question 1, it was not surprising that students B and C chose option 
(a). Despite her response to Question 1, Student A also selected option (a). Student D chose option 
(d) with the accompanying explanation that risk could refer to events with positive or negative 
outcomes. She also stated that the media tend to use the term risk when discussing negative 
outcomes. 
We conjecture that there may be several reasons to explain why risk is associated with 
negative outcomes. One reason may be that the students cannot envisage the complete sample space 
of outcomes associated with an event under consideration. Confounding this issue is the fact that 
everyday language may interfere with risk perception so that even if students are able to imagine the 
complete sample space of outcomes, they may use different language to describe the likelihood of 
each outcome. In addition, the availability heuristic may be operating in such a way to influence the 
students’ perception risk, a fact that Student D was aware of. As an example, consider testing the 
effectiveness of a new drug. A naïve consideration of all possible outcomes would be to state that the 
drug either worked, or did not work. However, not only would it be of interest to establish whether 
or not the drug worked, but also if the drug caused any side effects. Therefore, a complete list of 
outcomes may be: (1) the drug works and there are no side effects, (2) the drug works and there are 
side effects, (3) the drug doesn’t work and there are no side effects, and (4) the drug doesn’t work 
and there are side effects. When asked to assess the riskiness of the four outcomes, it may be that the 
language depends on the outcome. For example, the word ‘chance’ may be used to describe the 
likelihood of outcome (1) which describes a positive response, while the word ‘risk’ is used for the 
other outcomes which all include at least one negative response. 
Ranking Risks 
The second question, which was not part of the Dargahi-Noubary and Growney (1998) 
questionnaire, required the students to rank a list of ten causes of death according to their risk, with a 
rank of 1 being allocated to the event with the highest risk, and a rank of 10 to the event with the 
lowest risk. Eight of the causes of death were due to injury, either deliberate or accidental, with the 
remaining two (smoking and stroke) being disease-related. This question aimed to provide some 
insight into the students’ perceptions of the comparative risks of several events and was based on 
similar questions adopted by others, for example Iman (1994) and Jones (2012). Students were then 
asked what background information they would need in order to estimate the risks associated with 
each event. The rankings from the students are provided in Table 3, with the mean rank being the 
average awarded across all four students. The final column in Table 3 gives the actual ranking of the 
deaths due to injury provided by the National Safety Council (National Safety Council, 2006), an 
organisation that collates data on such events for the United States, with the relative rankings of 
deaths due to smoking-related illnesses and strokes obtained from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention website (www.cdc.gov).  
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Cause of death 
Student 
Mean rank NSC/CDC rank 
A B C D 
Falling 7 10 10 3 9 5 
Firearm assault 9 1 6 9 7 6 
Motorcycle accident 8 4 1 8 4 8 
Motor vehicle accident 3 5 7 7 5 3 
Pedestrian accident 2 8 3 4 3 7 
Stroke 6 9 4 5 6 2 
Smoking 4 7 9 6 8 1 
Suicide 1 3 2 1 1 4 
Natural forces 10 6 8 10 10 10 
Drowning 5 2 5 2 2 9 
Table 3. Students’ and NSC/CDC rankings for Question 2 
There were several interesting aspects to the student responses to Question 2. Firstly, students 
tended to rank suicide very high despite its actual ranking of 4. Secondly, while smoking and stroke 
ranked highest according to the data provided by the CDC, students placed both of these causes of 
death as low (8, 9) or moderately low (4-6). In addition, two students ranked drowning as their 
second highest cause of death, while the data provided by the NSC resulted in a rank of 9. Finally, 
two students ascribed the lowest possible rank of 10 to falling, while its relative ranking is 5. 
Possible explanations for these results include the use of the availability heuristic, a lack of 
awareness of critical questions, and the notion of conditioning on an event.  
Availability Heuristic. The role that the availability heuristic plays is the possibility that the 
students are relying on media reports and subsequent conversations with their peer groups and/or 
family to make conclusions about the incidence of suicide, drowning and deaths from smoking or 
strokes. This study took place around the time when the media had reported on several high-profile 
celebrity suicides, thereby perhaps distorting the perception of the prevalence of suicide. In Student 
D’s words, “as you grow older you are more familiar with death… from old age or suicide kind of 
because you hear a lot about it, but when it comes to being hit on a motorcycle you are like oh, I 
haven’t heard that for ages”. Cases of drowning also receive heightened media-attention, largely due 
to the fact that in New Zealand water-based activities such as fishing, swimming, surfing and sailing 
are popular leisure pursuits and the media therefore have a responsibility to raise an awareness of the 
dangers associated with these activities. Thus students may perceive drowning to be more common 
than it actually is. On the other hand, news reports about deaths due to strokes and smoking are few 
and far between. Given the tendency of the media to report prolifically on relatively rare events, this 
may have distorted the students’ perceptions of the regularity with which some of these events occur.  
Critical questions. It appears that these students did not consider the questions that should be 
asked, such as the critical questions outlined in Table 1, when ranking the events in Table 2. Taking 
falling as an example, it appears that the students may be considering that their own risk and that of 
their peers, of dying from a fall is very low and that that is the basis for the low ranking. They do not 
appear to consider the time frame over which the events are considered. If they had taken the time 
frame into account, then perhaps they would have recognised that on a population level the risk of 
dying from a fall is not insignificant due to the higher prevalence in the elderly. The same may be 
said for their comparatively low rankings for deaths from smoking and strokes, since they perhaps 
don’t see these events as being relevant to themselves or to their peer groups. However, even though 
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the students did not appear to reflect on the critical questions when ranking the events in Table 2, 
they appeared have an awareness of some of the questions when they were asked what information 
would be required in order to provide numerical estimates. Responses included a requirement to have 
information in the form of frequencies, for example Student B stated: “How often each of the events 
occurs” which suggests that she was considering the risks at a population level rather than at a local 
level. Student B also asked for information as to whom the risk applies, for example “How often 
does the person smoke?” and “Motor cycle accident – was the person wearing a helmet? What speed 
were they going?” thereby demonstrating an awareness of sample space and its relevance when 
required to make a judgment.  
Conditioning on the event. Follow-up interviews with the students uncovered an interesting 
feature to one student’s interpretation of this task. Student B explained that she allocated a rank of 3 
to suicide and explained “I wasn’t sure whether thinking … if you’re going to commit suicide what 
is your chance of dying from it, it’s pretty high. Like if you’re already in the act…” and, for motor 
vehicle accidents “a lot of people survive car accidents, so it was probably lower than suicide” which 
she ranked as 5. Student B appears to be using conditioning in her reasoning by considering the risk 
of dying given each event is underway, and therefore ranking them according to the likelihood of 
surviving the event once it has happened. Despite this reasoning, her rankings for suicide and motor 
vehicle accidents were similar to the NSC data-based rankings. While assessing the relative rankings 
of the events in Table 1, Student B appears to be integrating knowledge about context and 
consequence as part of her reasoning strategy, giving her a sense of the size of risk that she might 
attribute to the events. Her belief is that once engaged in the act of suicide, the chance of survival is 
very low, while she believes there is a much higher chance of surviving a motor vehicle accident. 
Her contextual knowledge does not seem to include an awareness that there will be many 
unsuccessful suicide attempts which is not surprising given that such events are generally 
undocumented in the media and elsewhere.  
Numbers Associated with Risk 
Question 6 required the students to describe a risky activity in which they had been involved, 
and to estimate the amount of risk associated with that activity. They were then asked to consider 
how their friends might respond to the risk estimates for the same activity and to explain their 
reasoning (Dargahi-Noubary & Growney, 1998). The activity provided by Student A was that of 
going on an overnight hiking expedition in the bush, with negative outcomes comprising getting lost 
or injured, or suffering from hypothermia. She explained that there was the potential for such a hike 
to be considered a high-risk activity, but that the preparatory groundwork and the experience of the 
hike leaders meant that the actual risk was fairly low, giving a numerical value of 2%. In her 
response, Student A exhibits the personal control heuristic by considering that the preparatory 
actions of group would directly influence the possibility of a hazardous outcome. She then went on 
to explain that the risk estimates provided by friends who were involved in the same activity would 
depend on their individual experience levels and their perceptions of the competence of hike leaders.  
Student C’s example was of riding her unicycle to dance class. She felt that this was a high 
risk activity since a unicycle is difficult to control and can be very unstable on uneven ground. She 
gave a numerical value of 70% for her own risk of falling and explained that this was because of the 
“numerous things that could go wrong”. She believed that her peers would have a much higher 
(“maybe 90%”) chance of falling since they were less experienced. Again, there is evidence of the 
personal control heuristic in Student C’s response although she is aware that, despite her level of 
experience, she is still vulnerable. 
While Student A’s risk estimate is very low (2%) compared with that of Student C (70%), it 
is worth mentioning that the negative outcomes associated with the hiking activity may well be 
perceived as being more serious than those associated with falling off a unicycle, particularly when 
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protected by a cycling helmet. Therefore the severity of the consequences may be influencing the 
students’ risk perceptions more than the actual likelihood of adverse events occurring.  
Risk Representations 
In order to gain some insight into how these four students reasoned about risk when presented 
with varied, and sometimes unfamiliar, risk representations, further tasks were given. In these tasks, 
students worked in pairs to understand and reason with risks presented both visually and 
numerically. The visual representations included both graphical formats with information being 
displayed as line graphs, and pictorial formats with information being displayed as icons. Numerical 
representations involved information being presented either in the form of probabilities, natural 
frequencies, or two-way tables. 
Visual risk representations. Graphical information on the risk of invasive breast cancer 
diagnosis (Dupont & Plummer, 1996) was presented to the students (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. 15 year absolute risk of invasive breast cancer diagnosis by current age and relative 
risk (Dupont & Plummer, 1996, p. 2196) 
This particular format would not have been familiar to the students. However, both pairs of 
students were able to read information from the graphs, and to think of some risk factors that might 
explain the different R-lines in the graph. Students A and B suggested that family history and 
lifestyle would be factors that may influence an individual’s breast cancer risk, while Students C and 
D suggested exposure to UV light. When asked to estimate the probability of someone aged 60 with 
an R-line value of 4 being diagnosed with invasive breast cancer within a 15 year time period, all 
four students were able to interpret the graph correctly and provide a sensible answer. Students were 
then asked why all of the curves appeared to peak at the age of 65. Students A and B were able to 
make use of their background contextual knowledge with Student A stating: “…and maybe if you’ve 
had all those increased risk factors such as family history you’ll have got it before then so if you’ve 
got all the way to 65 means you’ve got a good family history.” When asked if a corresponding graph 
for women in New Zealand would look similar to Figure 1, which is for US women, Students A and 
B noted that the graph would look similar because “we live in very similar lifestyles and have a 
similar demographic to the US, we’re a Western culture and if you went to Africa you’d probably get 
a different graph”. On the other hand, Students C and D thought the graph would be different 
because in the US there are “different diagnostic techniques or not as many people in New Zealand 
have scans… so it won’t be exactly the same percentage”. While each pair of students answered this 
question differently from one another, their responses were sensible and indicated that they were all 
using their contextual knowledge about breast cancer, and integrating this into their reasoning. 
Two different situations, both incorporating pictorial risk information in the form of icons, 
were also provided (see Figure 2). The information related to the effects of statins (cholesterol-
lowering drugs) on the incidence of heart attack/stroke (see www.understandinguncertainty.org 
website, Spiegelhalter). Scenario 1 used loss framing by focusing on the disadvantages of not taking 
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statins while Scenario 2 used gain framing by describing the positive effects of taking statins. Within 
each of these scenarios the information was provided visually in two ways; either with grouped icons 
where like-icons are placed in groups as can be seen in Figures 2(a) and 2(c), or with randomly 
placed icons where like-icons are placed randomly as can be seen in Figures 2(b) and 2(d). 
Scenario 1 
Your chance of 
experiencing a 
heart attack or 
stroke in 10 years 
without Statins is       
in 100, which is 
reduced to      in 
100 with Statins. 
 
 
2(a) 
 
2(b) 
Scenario 2 
Your chance of 
avoiding a heart 
attack or stroke in 
10 years without 
Statins is       in 
100, which is 
increased to     in 
100 with Statins. 
 
2(c) 
 
2(d) 
Figure 2. Pictorial representations for risks with loss framing (Scenario 1) and gain framing 
(Scenario 2) with grouped icons (a, c) or randomly placed icons (b, d) 
(http://understandinguncertainty.org/node/233) 
The students understood the visual representations shown in Figure 2 and did not appear to 
have any trouble in answering the questions stated within each scenario. When asked for their 
opinions on the grouped icons versus randomly placed icons, Students A and B expressed a 
preference for grouped icons with Student A stating that they were “easier to understand 
conceptually whereas counting them wasn’t really that hard but visually looking at it, it was a lot 
easier when they were grouped”. Whether the icons were placed in groups or randomly did not 
appear to make a difference to Students C and D. The students were then asked if they had a 
preference for Scenario 1 or for Scenario 2. This questioning was aimed at discovering whether the 
verbal frame made a difference to the students’ reasoning. Again, students C and D had no real 
preference while Students A and B mentioned that it depended on the numbers. Student A said: “It 
was interesting because they’ve both got a difference of two but with the 90s it seems like a smaller 
gap… so it seems more significant when you’re talking about the 8 and the 10, even though they’re 
both just two”. Her statement suggests that the effects of the statins are more apparent within the loss 
frame of Scenario 1 because the difference between 8 and 10 is relatively larger than the 
corresponding difference between 90 and 92 when the situation is expressed within the gain frame of 
Scenario 2. 
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Numerical risk representations. In order to explore these students’ reasoning when 
confronted with numerical risk information, a breast screening and diagnosis problem was presented 
in two ways; one probabilistically, the other with natural frequencies (Gigerenzer, 2002; see Table 
4). 
Version 
(a) 
The probability that a woman of age 40 has breast cancer is about 1 per cent.  If she has 
breast cancer, the probability she tests positive on a screening mammogram is 90 per cent. 
If she does not have breast cancer, the probability that she nevertheless tests positive is 9 
per cent. What are the chances that a woman who tests positive actually has breast 
cancer? 
Version 
(b) 
Eight out of every 1000 women have breast cancer. Of these 8 women with breast cancer, 
7 will have a positive mammogram. Of the remaining 992 women who don’t have breast 
cancer, some 70 will have a positive mammogram. Imagine a sample of 1000 women who 
have a positive mammogram. How many of these women actually have breast cancer? 
Table 4. Two versions of problem given to students (Gigerenzer, 2002) 
Students A and B, who received version (a), immediately drew a probability tree and wrote 
the correct probabilities along the branches of the tree. As they started to multiply the probabilities 
along two sets of branches and add them together, they then decided that only the branch reflecting 
those with breast cancer who tested positive was needed. Student B stated “so isn’t it just 90%?” and 
Student A agreed. Students C and D received version (b), but did not draw a probability tree. Instead, 
they tackled the problem verbally and concluded that 77 women had a positive mammogram, “and 
how many of these women actually have breast cancer? So isn’t it just seven out of 77?”.  The 
students who were given the risk information in probabilistic format appeared to lose sight of the 
relevant sample space, convincing themselves incorrectly that it was women who have breast cancer. 
However, the students provided with numerical information gave the impression that they were able 
to retain information about the relevant sample space whilst discussing the problem, thereby arriving 
at the correct answer. 
In the Question 9 of the questionnaire, which students answered individually, they were given 
a two-way table describing the outcomes (cured or not cured) of a group of individuals with a serious 
skin rash who either received treatment A or treatment B. They were asked to calculate the 
probability of being cured with treatment A, and then to critique a newspaper headline stating that a 
person with a serious skin rash is twice as likely to be cured if using treatment A as a person using 
treatment B. In order to answer this question, the students were required to calculate the probability 
of a person being cured with treatment B, and then to calculate the required relative risk. This 
question was very familiar to the students as it resembled typical questions asked in their probability 
standard of the previous year. All of the students answered this question well. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper explores the strategies used by Year 13 students as they were asked to interpret, 
rank and reason with risks in a variety of contexts, and were confronted with a variety of risk 
representations. In this final section we discuss reasoning strategies and risk conceptions displayed 
by the four students and consider the contribution that the findings may have to existing research in 
this area. We then discuss the implications the findings have on teaching risk in the classroom. 
However, we will first comment on the limitations of the study. 
Limitations of the Study 
This exploratory study was very small, focusing as it did on only four high-achieving 
students. Within the constraints of the study, many potential areas for investigation were not 
Budgett, O’Carroll & Pfannkuch 
possible. For example, it was not possible to explore the effects of cognitive limitations and biases 
and personal characteristics such as cultural background, which researchers have found to be 
contributory factors in interpreting and misinterpreting risk information (Anderson & Iltis, 2008; 
Sorensen, Gyrd-Hansen, Kristiansen, Nexoe, & Nielsen, 2008).  
Potential Characterisations of Student Conceptions 
While acknowledging the limitations of the study, the findings seem to suggest that certain 
potential characterisations of student conceptions are apparent (see Table 5). These conceptions, 
based on responses to all questions in the questionnaire and on all tasks in the second interview, will 
now be discussed further. 
Conceptions Description Characterisation in study Student Reasoning 
Availability heuristic Judgement is created on 
the availability or recall of 
information in the 
memory 
• Likelihood of risks are 
given 
 
 
 
• Likelihood of risks are 
estimated 
Led to sensible use of own 
contextual knowledge to 
judge reasons for 
likelihoods 
 
Own contextual knowledge 
led to errors in judgements 
Critical questions to 
ask when judging risk 
information 
Risk of what? 
• Baseline information 
 
 
 
 
• Risk communication 
 
What is the frame? 
• Time frame 
 
 
• Verbal frame 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To whom does the risk 
apply? 
Does it apply to me? 
 
Size of risk depends on the baseline 
 
 
 
 
Can be verbal, visual or numerical 
format 
 
 
Risk of events depends on the time 
frame 
 
Information presented in 
positive/negative, harm/benefit 
frames influences estimation of 
risks 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgements of risks are influenced 
by identification of relevant sample 
space 
 
Not taken into account 
when judging risk but 
mentioned when asked how 
to determine risk 
 
Appropriate reasoning 
seemed to depend on format 
 
Not considered when time 
frame was not given 
 
• Larger numbers 
influenced preference 
for positive frame 
 
• Preference for risk 
expressed as harm or 
benefit not evident 
 
 
Relevant sample space not 
taken into account unless 
given 
Reasoning 
numerically with risk 
• Estimating risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sense of size of risk (e.g. 10%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Considered context and 
consequence of risk 
 
• Developing a sense of 
associating numbers 
appropriately with high 
and low risk 
 
• Personal control ideas 
tended to lead to a 
disregard of universal 
sample space 
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• Calculating risk 
 
 
 
 
 
• Language of risk 
 
• Natural frequencies 
 
 
• Proportions 
 
 
Everyday language is different 
from probability language. 
Probability and risk calculations are 
the same 
 
Led to appropriate 
calculations 
 
Led to inappropriate 
calculations  
 
Some perceived risk as 
having a negative 
connotation  
Sample space  • Universal sample 
space 
 
• Conditional sample 
space 
All population units 
 
 
Subset of units in population 
Tended to disregard when 
assessing risk 
 
Used when thinking about 
risk applying to me 
Table 5. Summary of four students’ conceptions and reasoning about risk in the study 
 
The availability heuristic. People naturally make use of their experiences in order to make 
judgements. The availability heuristic is employed when we recall information from family, peers 
and the media to analyse risk information (Kahneman, 2011). In this study, the students’ use of the 
availability heuristic was characterised in two ways. Firstly, when faced with several situations from 
which death could arise, students were asked to rank them in order, from the most to the least risky.  
The disparity between the students’ ranks and those of the NSC and the CDC appear to be due, in 
part, to the students’ reliance on memory which brought to mind examples of moderately common or 
relatively uncommon causes such as suicide and drowning, and propelled them to the top of their 
lists. Similarly, common causes of death such as falling or from the effect of smoking, not readily 
reported in the media, came close to the bottom of their lists. However, when the students were asked 
to consider the reasons for the different R-lines in Figure 1 (see Section 4.4.1), they were able to 
draw on their contextual knowledge and provide sensible suggestions. This characterisation of the 
availability heuristic, when students were told that the risk profiles vary, had a beneficial effect on 
student reasoning.  
Critical questions to ask when judging risk information. The students in the study did not 
appear to consider the critical questions or to search for background information unless specifically 
asked how to determine risk. In certain instances, they were aware of notions such as time frame but 
only if it was provided, such as their reasoning with the visual representation of 15-year breast 
cancer diagnosis (see Figure 1). In other cases they seemed unaware of the importance of the time 
frame which meant that they were unable to judge how likely it was to die as the result of a fall or 
from the effects of smoking. The notion of verbal framing was not investigated thoroughly in the 
study, although for two students it appeared that framing preference had more to do with numbers 
than with the wording of the question. With regard to the question “to whom does the risk apply?”, 
students were able to judge risks based on the relevant sample space or conditioning event, but again 
only if this information was provided. This was evident in their responses to the visual representation 
of risk in Figure 1, particularly when asked to reflect on the corresponding representation for a 
different group of women. However, when the sample space was not stated explicitly, for example 
when ranking the risks in Table 1, the relevant sample space did not appear to be considered. Such 
findings lend credence to the beliefs of researchers such as Gigerenzer (2002) and Watson (2006) 
who state that by asking critical questions of risk information and being aware of the ways in which 
risk can be represented, we may be more informed and not so easily manipulated. 
Reasoning numerically with risk. When it came to estimating risk, students appeared to 
consider both context and consequence. For example, when describing a risky activity in which they 
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had been involved, their assessment of the size of the risk seemed to be based on the severity of the 
outcome in conjunction with how likely it would be to experience such an outcome. The student who 
provided the unicycling example (see Section 4.3) noted that the risk of an adverse event such as 
falling off was relatively high (70%), but that there were lots of possible things that could go wrong 
due to the instability of a unicycle and the likelihood of unstable ground. The student who described 
the hiking scenario gave a much lower estimate (2%), but explained that although the activity in 
itself could be considered high risk, the preparatory groundwork and experience of the hike leaders 
would ameliorate this risk substantially. The idea that the severity of the consequences may be 
influencing the students’ risk perceptions more than the probability of an undesirable outcome is in 
keeping with the findings of Sadique, et al. (2013). However, there was also a tendency for students 
to overestimate the risk of rare but potentially dramatic events such as suicide, which is indicated by 
the availability heuristic characterisation, and also by the research of Everitt (1999). With regard to 
calculating risks numerically, the students in the study were more comfortable working with natural 
frequencies than with probabilistic information such as proportions which is in line with the research 
(Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Hoffrage et al., 2000; Martignon, 2014; Peters et al., 2007). Another 
characterisation of reasoning numerically with risk that was evident in the study was the perception 
of most of the students that risk has a negative connotation. This finding supports Watson’s (2006) 
belief that interpretation and evaluation of the language of risk, when stated in a social context, is 
crucial. The fact that Gal (2002) includes a language and context component in his probability 
literacy framework suggests that when teaching risk, the students’ perceptions must be considered. 
Sample space. The final characterisation of student conception evident in this study is that of 
sample space. While consideration of sample space underpinned the characterisation of ‘Judgement 
of risks are influenced by identification of relevant sample space’ in Table 4, it is worthy of a 
mention in its own right. When asked to assess risk by ranking (see Section 4.2) or by calculating 
having been provided with numerical information in a probabilistic format (see Section 4.4.2), the 
students tended to be unaware of the sample space of interest. However, when specifically asked to 
consider risks for a particular group of individuals or units (see Section 4.4.1), or to estimate risks for 
which they had no relevant numerical information (see Section 4.2.2), they were either able to 
integrate knowledge of the relevant conditional sample space or to ask for relevant information about 
particular characteristics to arrive at sensible conclusions. Sample space is well-recognised as a key 
concept for learning about probability (Batanero & Sanchez, 2005; Jones, Langrall, Thornton, & 
Mogill, 1997; Savard, 2014). In light of the findings of this small study, it would appear that sample 
space, as a concept, should also have prominence in the learning of risk. 
Curriculum and risk 
As evidenced by the findings of this small exploratory study, the four high-achieving students 
who participated were proficient at calculating risks and relative risks from two-way tables and were 
able to reason effectively with different risk representations. However, the reasoning strategies 
employed by these students did not always lead to appropriate judgments or conclusions. The current 
practice of teaching risk and probability calculations, with little regard to the wider context, results in 
students being capable of the mathematical manipulations and uncomplicated interpretations of risk 
statements. However, integrating more context into the situations provided to students, and building 
in students an awareness of intuitions and potential biases, may result in a deeper conceptual 
understanding of risk.  
Implication for Teaching 
Gigerenzer (2002) describes three important steps when it comes to teaching people to reason 
with risk. The first step, which he calls “Franklin’s Law”, is to develop the awareness that 
uncertainty is a given since, according to Benjamin Franklin, “In this world nothing is certain but 
death and taxes”. He recommends demonstrating this through the use of everyday contexts in which 
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uncertainty is present rather than through the use of imaginary situations. The second step, “Beyond 
ignorance of risks”, involves teaching people to know how to use information to estimate risks and to 
be cognisant of the difficulties that may arise in doing so, such as biased media reporting.  The third 
step, “Communication and Reasoning”, includes educating people in the various ways in which risk 
can be represented, and to develop awareness of the ways in which we can be manipulated by 
different representations.  
With an awareness of the student conceptions that were apparent in this study, we conjecture 
that attending explicitly to notions such as those outlined in Table 4 may benefit school students such 
as those who were involved in the study as they learn to interpret and reason with risk in varied 
situations. Our findings suggest that intuition guided the students’ reasoning processes in many of 
the tasks in this study, particularly when reliable information was not provided. In such instances the 
students adopted a risk as feelings approach. However, when specifically asked for numerical 
estimates, or for reasons to explain certain factual findings, they took a logical approach, thereby 
employing risk as analysis (c.f. Slovic & Peters, 2006). 
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